DOI link to open access article:
Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Volume 6, issue 1, pages 37-58 (December 2021)
We consider 2-person bargaining situations in which the feasible set is known, but the disagreement point is uncertain. We investigate the implications of various axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points and characterize the family of linear solutions, which includes the egalitarian, lexicographic egalitarian, Nash, and Kalai-Rosenthal solutions. We also show that how the important subfamilies (or members) of this family can be singled out by imposing additional axioms or strengthening the axioms used in the characterizations.
Keywords: Axiomatic approach to bargaining problems, uncertain disagreement point, linear solutions.
JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D70.