DOI link to open access article:
A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem
Gian Caspari
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Volume 8, issue 1, pages 75-96 (December 2023)
doi: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.003
We study multi-category housing allocation problems: A finite set of objects, which is sorted into categories of equal size, has to be allocated to a finite set of individuals, such that everyone obtains exactly one object from each category. We show that, in the large class of category-wise neutral and non-bossy mechanisms, any strategy-proof mechanism can be constructed by simply letting individuals choose an object from each category one after another following some priority order. We refer to these mechanisms as multi-category serial dictatorships and advocate for selecting priority orders across categories as fairly as possible.
Keywords: Matching, envy-free, multi-category housing allocation.
JEL Classification Numbers: D44, D50.