DOI link to open access article:
Bayesian Bullshit
Sajan Srivastava, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Rakesh Vohra
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Volume 9, issue 1, pages 13-53 (December 2024)
doi: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.003
A bullshitter neither knows nor cares about the truth, and therefore, it has been asserted, is more pernicious than a liar. We examine this assertion within the standard model of cheap talk communication where a bullshitter is modeled as an uninformed Sender. We show that in some circumstances, uncertainty about whether the Sender is informed or not can increase the welfare of the Receiver.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, information design, cheap talk.
JEL Classification Numbers: C6, D82, D83.