2018 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design *The Conference Programme*

Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design

&

Durham University Business School

12-13 May 2018 Durham, UK



Institute *of* Advanced Study



Programme Committee

SPMiD Zaifu Yang Durham Daniel Z. Li Bibhas Saha Ayse Yazici Xiaogang Che Simone Tonin Anil Yildizparlak

Society Homepage

http://www.mechanism-design.org/society.php

Conference Homepage

https://www.dur.ac.uk/business/news-and-events/event-details/?id=37684

Acknowledgements

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Instructions

- All keynote addresses and all parallel sessions will be held at Durham University Business School (DUBS), Mill Hill Lane (MHL), Durham, DH1 3LB.
- In each parallel session, the last speaker should chair all but her/his own presentation, while the first speaker should chair the last speaker's presentation. Each presentation is 30 minutes long and should be strictly observed.
- Each session consists of three presentations except the last three parallel sessions which consist of four presentations.
- At the beginning of each session, for your presentation, a PhD student will be available to help you upload your PDF or PPT file to the local system.
- During lunch, tea and coffee and gala dinner time, every participant is kindly requested to wear the conference badge.
- There will be coach service for delegates from Radisson Blu Hotel to DUBS at **8:30** on Saturday, 12 May and at **09:00** on Sunday, 13 May.
- There will also be coach service from DUBS to the railway station with a drop off point in the city centre at **15:50** on Sunday, 13 May.

Lunches and Dinner

- Lunches, tea, coffee and biscuits will be provided at DUBS Bar Lounge, May 12-13, 2018.
- The gala dinner will be held in Joachim Room, College of St Hild & St Bede, St Hild's Lane, Durham DH1 1SZ at 19:00-21:00 on Saturday 12 May. There will be coach service for delegates from DUBS to College of St Hild & St Bede at **18:15** on Saturday, 12 May.
- You will be given a gala dinner table number when you receive this brochure.

Programme Overview

Day 1: Sat 12th May 2018	
Coach from Radisson Blu to DUBS	08:30
Registration	08:30-09:00
3 Parallel Sessions	09:00-10:30
Break	10:30-11:00
Welcome Remarks	11:00-11:15
Keynote Address	11:15-12:15
Lunch	12:15-13:15
3 Parallel Sessions	13:15-14:45
Break	14:45-15:00
3 Parallel Sessions	15:00-16:30
Break	16:30-17:00
Keynote Address	17.00-18.00
Coach from DUBS to College of St Hild & St Bede	18:15
Gala Dinner	19:00-21:00

Day 2: Sun 13th May 2018

Coach from Radisson Blu to DUBS	09:00
3 Parallel Sessions	09:30-11:00
Break	11:00-11:30
Keynote Address	11:30-12:30
Lunch	12:30-13:30
3 Parallel Sessions	13:30-15:30
Coach from DUBS to railway station\city centre	15:50

Welcome Remarks

Room: MHL452

Sat 12th May 2018; 11:00-11:15

Richard Harris (Research Dean, DUBS) Zaifu Yang (Chair, SPMiD) Chair: Bibhas Saha (Durham University Business School)

Keynote Addresses

Sat 12th May 2018; 11:15-12:15

Vincent Crawford (University of Oxford) Title: Efficient Mechanisms for Level-*k* Bilateral Trading Chair: Zaifu Yang (University of York)

Sat 12th May 2018; 17:00-18:00

David Martimort (Paris School of Economics)

Title: "When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making

Chair: Daniel Li (Durham University Business School)

Sun 13th May 2018; 11:00-12:00

Hervé Moulin (University of Glasgow)

Title: Fair Division in the Age of Internet

Chair: Onur Kesten (Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business)

Parallel Session Overview Day 1:

Day 1 Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-10:30, Sat 12th May 2018)

A1: Matching 1	B1: Auction	C1: Mechanism Design 1
Room: MHL 452	Room: MHL 454	Room: MHL 405

Day 1 Parallel Sessions 2 (13:15-14:45, Sat 12th May 2018)

A2: Matching 2	B2: Sequential Auction	C2: Game Theory
Room: MHL 452	Room: MHL 454	Room: MHL 405

Day 1 Parallel Sessions 3 (15:00-16:30, Sat 12th May 2018)

A3: Matching 3	B3: Information and	C3: Mechanism Design 2
Room: MHL 452	Learning	Room: MHL 405
	Room: MHL 405	

Parallel Session Overview Day 2:

Day 2 Parallel Sessions 4 (09:30-11:00, Sun 13th May 2018)

A4: Matching 4	B4: Sequential Search/	B4: Contract Theory
Room: MHL 452	Assignment	Room: MHL 454
	Room: MHL 454	

Day 2 Parallel Sessions 5 (13:30-15:30, Sun 13th May 2018)

A5: Contests/Information	B5 : Mechanism Design 3	C5: Voting
Room: MHL 452	Room: MHL 454	Room: MHL 405

C1: Mechanism Design 1

- Siyang Xiong, University of Bristol. Designing Referenda: An Economist's Pessimistic Perspective.
- Kim-Sau Chung, Hong Kong Baptist University. Conservative Experts (e.g., Judges) in a Changing Society
- Bo Chen, University of Warwick. Incentive Schemes to Resolve Parkinson's Law in Project Management.

Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-10:30, 12 May) Day 1

A1: Matching 1

- Jörgen Kratz, Lund University. Triage in Kidney Exchange.
- Battal Doğan, University of Lausanne. Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago.
- Péter Biró, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare.

B1: Auction

- Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka university. Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms.
- Xiaogang Che, Durham University Business School. Deposit Requirements in Auctions with Buyer Search.
- Zaifu Yang, University of York. Efficient Ascending Menu Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders.

Room: MHL 454

Room: MHL 405

Parallel Sessions 2 (13:15-14:45, 12 May) Day 1

A2: Matching 2

- Ayşe Yazıcı, Durham University Business School. A Closer Look at Incentives in Senior Level Decentralized Random Matching Markets.
- Christoph Schlegel, City, University of London. Group-Strategy-Proof and Stable Mechanisms for Job Matching with Continuous Transfers.
- Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business. Efficient and Incentive Compatible Mediation: An Ordinal Mechanism Design Approach.

B2: Sequential Auction

- Audrey Hu, City University of Hong Kong. Multi-Object Auctions with Ensuing Competition.
- Daniel Li, Durham University Business School. Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline.
- Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore. Optimal Sequential Shortlisting in Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition.

C2: Game Theory

- Maria Kozlovskaya, Aston Business School. Characterising Mixed Equilibria in a Market Game.
- Mark Voorneveld, Stockholm School of Economics. Best-response equivalence and quadratic scoring rules.
- Indrajit Ray, University of Cardiff. Any Outcome is an Interior Equilibrium in a Market.

Room: MHL 454

Room: MHL 405

Parallel Sessions 3 (15:00-16:30, 12 May) Day 1

A3: Matching 3

- Li Chen, University of Gothenburg. Designing Heaven's Will: Assigning Civil Servants by Drawing Lots in Imperial China.
- Alberto Vesperoni, University of Klagenfurt. A Threshold Model of Urban Development.
- Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford. Refugee Resettlement.

B3: Information and Learning

- Alexei Parakhonyak, University of Oxford. Inducing Herding with Capacity Constraints.
- Peter Bayer, Maastricht University. Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games.
- Nora Szech, Karlsruhe Institue of Technology. Information Design and Self Control.

C3: Mechanism Design 2

Room: MHL 405

- Eugene Jeong, University of Bristol. Referral Incentive Design.
- Albin Erlanson, Stockholm School of Economics. Optimal allocation with verifiable information.
- Yuan Ju, University of York. Divide and Choose: A strategic approach to bankruptcy problems.

Room: MHL 452

Parallel Sessions 4 (09:30-11:00, 13 May) Day 2

A4: Matching 4

- Flip Klijn, Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE-CSIC). The Core of Roommate Problems: Size and Rank-Fairness within Matched Pairs.
- Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne. Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants.
- Tamás Fleiner, Budapest University of Technology and Economics. Efficient Assignments in Generalized Roommates Problems.

B4: Sequential Search/Assignment

Room: MHL 454

- Joosung Lee, University of Edinburgh. Dynamics of Optimal Search Intensity.
- Patrick Harless, University of Glasgow. Efficient Rules for Probabilistic Assignment.
- Kaustav Das, University of Exeter. Strategic Experimentation with Asymmetric Players.

C4: Contract Theory

Room: MHL 405

- Yangguang Huang, HKUST. Supervisory Efficiency, Collusion, and Contract Design.
- Larry Yu Chen, University of Graz. Simplification of Contracting under Adverse Selection with Ex Post State.
- Andrew Clausen, University of Edinburgh. Extreme Incentives.

Parallel Sessions 5 (13:30-15:30, 13 May) Day 2

A5: Contests/Information

- Zhuoqiong Chen, HIT. Information Disclosure in Contests: Private vs. Public Signals.
- Bo Chen, Southern Methodist University. Optimal Disclosure Policy in Dynamic Research Tournaments.
- Simone Tonin, Durham University Business School. Existence and Optimality of Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Bilateral Oligopoly with Atoms and an Atomless Part.
- Andy Zapechelnyuk, University of Saint Andrews. Persuasion Meets Delegation.

B5: Mechanism Design 3

- Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow. Constrained Implementation.
- Helmuts Azacis, University of Cardiff. Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents.
- Andrew Mackenzie, Maastricht University. Club good mechanisms: from freeriders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization.
- Angel Hernando-Veciana, Universidad Carlos III. A Geometric Approach to the Complexity of Mechanisms.

C5: Voting/Game Theory

- Huaxia Zeng, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Probabilistic Generalized Median Voter Schemes: A Robust Characterization.
- Monica Giovanniello, University of Verona. Market for Votes: Conflict, Distribution, and Welfare.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, University of Birmingham. Conflict and Leadership: Why is there a Hawkish Drift in Politics?
- Bibhas Saha, Durham University Business School. Rational bettors and • corrupt book-making.

Room: MHL 452

Room: MHL 454

Emergency Calls

- 999 is the official emergency number in the UK. You should call this number, when there is danger to life or when violence is being used or threatened.
- 101 is the number to call when you want to contact local police when it's less urgent than a 999 call.