The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design is published by the Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design based at York, UK.
Its official identity is ISSN: 2399-844X (Print), 2399-8458 (Online), and DOI: 10.22574/jmid.
Publication is free of charge and articles are open-access to everyone.

Aims and scope

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design aims to publish original articles that deal with the issues of designing, improving, analysing and testing economic, financial, political, or social mechanisms and institutions. It welcomes theoretical, empirical, experimental, historical and practical studies. It seeks creative, interesting, rigorous, and logical research and strives for clarity of thought and expression. We particularly encourage less experienced researchers such as recent PhD graduates to submit their work to the Journal and are sympathetic towards those papers that are novel and innovative but which have been unsuccessful elsewhere. We hope that the published articles will be interesting and valuable to a broad audience from the areas of economics, finance, politics, law, computer science, management, history, mathematics, government, and related disciplines. The journal is an open-access, independent, peer-reviewed, non-profit, English-language journal with the purpose of disseminating and sharing the latest knowledge and understanding of the subject widely. Users have the right to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal.

In order for any work that is published by the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design to be freely accessible to the widest audience possible, when a paper is accepted by this Journal for publication, its author(s) will be asked to release the paper under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial license. While the authors retain the copyright of their published work, this license permits anyone to copy and distribute the paper for non-commercial purposes, provided that both the author(s) of the article and the Journal are properly acknowledged. For details of the copyrights, please see the "human-readable summary" of the license.

For further information, please contact Tommy Andersson, Vincent Crawford, David Martimort, Paul Schweinzer, or Zaifu Yang.

Accepted papers

Volume 8, issue 1 (December 2023)

2023 jMID Citation analysis

Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing Zhan Wang, Jinpeng Ma, and Hongwei Zhang, pages 1-55 Golden rule in cooperative commons Sjur Flåm, pages 57-74 A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem Gian Caspari, pages 75-96 Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players Pathikrit Basu, pages 97-106 Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening Braulio Calagua, pages 107-150

Volume 7, issue 1 (December 2022)

2022 jMID Citation analysis

Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications Oliver Board and Kim-Sau Chung, pages 1-43 Centralized clearing mechanisms in financial networks: A programming approach Péter Csóka and P. Jean-Jacques Herings, pages 45-69 Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes Dilek Sayedahmed, pages 71-111 Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited Krzysztof R. Apt and Jan Heering, pages 113-129 A regulatory arbitrage game: Off-balance-sheet leverage and financial fragility Dimitris Voliotis, pages 131-150

Volume 6, issue 1 (December 2021)

2021 jMID Citation analysis

Object-based unawareness: Axioms Oliver Board and Kim-Sau Chung, pages 1-36 Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems Youngsub Chun, pages 37-58 A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment Tobias Reischmann, Thilo Klein, and Sven Giegerich, pages 59-100 On the degree of distortions under second-degree price discrimination Ram Orzach and Miron Stano, pages 101-112 Dream teams and the Apollo effect Alex Gershkov and Paul Schweinzer, pages 113-148

Volume 5, issue 1 (December 2020)

2020 jMID Citation analysis

Implementation with ex post hidden actions Caleb Koch, pages 1-35 On optimal taxes and subsidies: A discrete saddle-point theorem with application to job matching under constraints Koji Yokote, pages 37-77 On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions Simon Hoof, pages 79-97 Matching with compatibility constraints: The case of the Canadian medical residency match Muhammad Maaz and Anastasios Papanastasiou, pages 99-117 Rights and rents in local commons Sjur Flåm, pages 119-140

Volume 4, issue 1 (November 2019)

2019 jMID Citation analysis

Efficient and dominance solvable auctions with interdependent valuations Kim-Sau Chung, Jeffrey C. Ely, pages 1-38 A new evaluation criterion for allocation mechanisms with application to vehicle license allocations in China Jianxin Rong, Ning Sun, Dazhong Wang, pages 39-86 Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size Ágnes Cseh, Tamás Fleiner, Petra Harján, pages 87-108 A comparison of NTU values in a cooperative game with incomplete information Andrés Salamanca, pages 109-117 Loss aversion in financial markets Liyan Yang, pages 119-137

Volume 3, issue 1 (December 2018)

2018 jMID Citation analysis

The uncovered set and the core: Cox’s result revisited Anindya Bhattacharya, Victoria Brosi, Francesco Ciardiello, pages 1-15 Strategy-proofness of stochastic assignment mechanisms André Schmelzer, pages 17-50 Efficient random assignment with cardinal and ordinal preferences James Fisher, pages 51-96 Mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants under dichotomous preferences Haris Aziz, pages 97-110 A reexamination of the Coase theorem Jingang Zhao, pages 111-132

Volume 2, issue 1 (December 2017)

2017 jMID Citation analysis

On a spontaneous decentralized market process Satoru Fujishige, Zaifu Yang, pages 1-37 Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions Ola Andersson, Tommy Andersson, pages 39-55 Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design André Veski, Péter Biró, Kaire Põder, Triin Lauri, pages 57-104 On the partnership formation problem Akiyoshi Shioura, pages 105-140 Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models Philip R. Neary, Jonathan Newton, pages 141-159

Volume 1, issue 1 (December 2016)

2016 jMID Citation analysis

Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions Jinpeng Ma, Qiongling Li, pages 1-44 School choice under complete information: An experimental study Yan Chen, Yingzhi Liang, Tayfun Sönmez, pages 45-82 On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game Papatya Duman, Walter Trockel, pages 83-107 An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders Gerard van der Laan, Zaifu Yang, pages 109-149 Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory Kazuo Murota, pages 151-273

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